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Abstract
Despite the impressive success of quantum structures to model long-standing human judgement and
decision puzzles, the quantum cognition research programme still faces challenges about its explanatory
power. Indeed, quantum models introduce new parameters, which may fit empirical data without nec-
essarily explaining them. Also, one wonders whether more general non-classical structures are better
equipped to model cognitive phenomena. In this paper, we provide a realistic-operational foundation of
decision processes using a known decision-making puzzle, the Ellsberg paradox, as a case study. Then,
we elaborate a novel representation of the Ellsberg decision situation applying standard quantum corre-
spondence rules which map realistic-operational entities into quantum mathematical terms. This result
opens the way towards an independent, foundational rather than phenomenological, motivation for a
general use of quantum Hilbert space structures in human cognition.
Keywords: Quantum structures; Cognitive science; Decision theory; Ellsberg paradox; Operational real-
ism.
1 Introduction
Traditional cognitive theories systematically apply classical set-theoretic structures to model human judge-
ments and decisions under uncertainty. This is particularly evident in theories of rational decision-making,
like expected utility theory, where Bayesian, or Kolmogorovian [1], models of probability directly follow
from axioms on agents’ preferences [2, 3].
However, several cognitive puzzles have been discovered in empirical tests, which provide evidence of
systematic deviations from Kolmogorovian probability structures (see, e.g., [4]). For example, Kahneman
and Tversky identified a conjunction fallacy in human probability judgements, namely, the law of mono-
tonicity of Kolmogorovian probability does not generally hold in this kind of judgements [5]. Also, in
human decision-making, Tversky and Shafir proved that the law of total Kolmogorovian probability does
not hold in the disjunction effect [6], while Allais and Ellsberg indicated that people do not always choose
by maximizing an expected utility with respect to a Kolmogorovian probability measure [7].
As a consequence of the puzzles above, traditional theories using Kolmogorovian structures, though
normatively compelling, are descriptively flawed, which led several authors to elaborate alternative pro-
posals able to more efficiently and realistically represent human behaviour. This was the starting point of
the bounded rationality research programme, initially proposed by Herbert Simon [8] and systematically ap-
plied by Kahneman and Tversky [5, 6] to describe concrete judgements and decisions. Bounded rationality
models give good predictions in a variety of circumstances. However, despite their simplicity and intuitive
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character, these models lack a unitary methodology, as well as deeper explanations, and thus provide a
very fragmented picture of cognitive phenomena [9].
The quantum cognition research programme has recently attracted the interest of the scientific commu-
nity due the superiority of quantum models over traditional and bounded rationality models to deal with
the puzzles above. Quantum models were successfully applied to a variety of complex cognitive processes,
including human language [10, 11, 12, 13], judgement [4, 14, 15] and decision [15, 16, 17] (see also [18]).
Despite these impressive results, however, quantum cognition still raises doubts regarding its explanatory
power. Indeed, on the one side, quantum cognitive models introduce new parameters, which may fit ex-
perimental data, but do not necessarily explain them. On the other side, one is naturally led to wonder
whether cognitive science really needs the entire mathematical formalism of quantum theory in Hilbert
space or, on the contrary, non-Kolmogorovian non-Hilbertian models of probability are needed (see, e.g.,
[19, 20]).
In the present paper, we present binding motivations towards an independent, foundational, rather
than purely phenomenological, justification of the quantum formalism in human judgement and decision-
making under uncertainty. We start from the realistic and operational axiomatizations of quantum physics
initiated by Jauch [21] and Piron [22] in Geneva and extended by Aerts (see, e.g., [23, 24]) in Brussels.
Efforts have been made in the second part of the last century to derive the mathematical formalism of
quantum theory in Hilbert space from more intuitive and empirically justified axioms, resting on basic
notions directly connected with the operations that are performed in a laboratory. Particularly, in the
Brussels approach, any physical entity is expressed in terms of the basic notions of state, context, property
and mutual relationships between them (SCoP system). The approach is realistic, in the sense that the
state, being the result of an effective preparation procedure, describes aspects of the reality of the entity.
The approach is also operational, in the sense that all basic notions are expressed in terms of well defined
empirical terms, like preparation and registration devices, statistics of outcomes, etc. If suitable “purely
operational” axioms are imposed on a SCoP system, then the Hilbert space representation uniquely arises
for the physical entity.
We believe that the above realistic-operational justification of the quantum Hilbert space formalism in
physics also provides a strong motivation, if not a justification in itself, for the use of quantum Hilbert
space structures in cognition. To this end we particularize in Sect. 4 to a specific decision-making situation,
the Ellsberg paradox situation, used as a case study here, the realistic-operational foundation of cognitive
entities we have recently elaborated [25], in which a cognitive entity is abstractly described in terms of
well defined empirical notions, i.e. state, context, property and outcome probability. Then, the stunning
analogies in the realistic and operational descriptions of entities in physical and cognitive realms, suggest
that the same Hilbert space leading axiomatics should be used for a cognitive, e.g., decision-making, entity
(Sect. 2).
The Ellsberg paradox is reviewed in Sect. 3, where we explain the difficulties of both expected utility
and bounded rationality theories, to accommodate Ellsberg preferences and the results of more general
Ellsberg-like decision situations.
We then elaborate in Sect. 5 a mathematical representation in Hilbert space of the Ellsberg paradox
situation and the ambiguity aversion pattern found in empirical literature. We had already presented
quantum models of various Ellsberg thought experiments, including two-color and three-color urns [16,
17, 26, 27, 28]. The novelty of the mathematical representation developed here consists in the fact that
it follows directly from the canonical quantum representation of the realistic-operational terms of state,
context, property and outcome probability in Hilbert space, which makes the use of quantum mathematics
in this kind of situations more firmly founded and generalizable to other decision situations.
We finally offer some conclusive remarks and considerations in Sect. 6, where we specify that the
realistic-operational foundation of cognitive science can be in principle extended to several other judgement
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and decision-making situations, which constitutes a strong indication that “possible failures of Hilbert space
modelling” should be searched in other cognitive domains than individual judgements and decisions.
2 Descriptive versus explanatory power of quantum structures
Traditional theories of individual judgement and decision-making use, often implicitly, set-theoretic struc-
tures, that closely resemble the formal operations of classical Boolean logic and Kolmogorovian probability
theory [1]. This is specially evident in rational decision theory, according to which rational agents behave
in such a way to maximize expected utility with respect to a Kolmogorovian probability measure and an
underlying economic model [2, 3].
These theories are normatively compelling, however, the judgement and decision puzzles in Sect. 1 make
them descriptively problematical and suggest alternative more realistic approaches to human behaviour
under uncertainty. A major research programme of this kind was initiated by Herbert Simon who put
forward the bounded rationality project [8]. Boundedly rational agents experience practical limitations in
formulating and solving complex problems and in processing information. They tackle such limitations by
taking mental short-cuts, making subjective evaluations and putting psychological aspects above rational
reasoning.
Within the bounded rationality project, one can cope with cognitive puzzles with judgement heuristics
and reasoning biases, namely, the conjunction fallacy with the representativeness heuristics [5], the Allais
paradox with prospect theory [6], the Ellsberg paradox with cumulative prospect theory [6], the disjunction
effect by uncertainty aversion [6], etc. These approaches undoubtedly provide an intuitive account of
how individuals actually behave in situations of uncertainty. However, the reader recognizes at once that
a rather eclectic methodology or, better, a variety of methodologies, are employed to accommodate the
puzzles above and, while some authors support the hypothesis of an adaptive toolbox to deal with these
problems [29], many psychologists will find the bounded rationality research programme as unsatisfactory,
while many philosophers of science will try to derive these puzzling phenomena from a universal theory
able to overcome the fragmentation of existing approaches.
The quantum cognition research programme reaches both effectiveness and unitarity. Since the nineties,
quantum Hilbert space models have shown impressive superiority over traditional and bounded rationality
approaches in dealing with the puzzles of human cognition and attributing them to genuine quantum effects,
like contextuality, emergence, entanglement, interference and superposition. On the other side, quantum
models introduce new parameters which can be possibly fitted by empirical data, without however nec-
essarily explaining them. Hence, the quantum cognition research programme, though phenomenologically
successful, does not seem to offer a deeper understanding and/or explanation of these puzzles. In addi-
tion, it is reasonable to wonder whether one really needs the entire Hilbert space formalism to represent
cognitive phenomena, and should not better use more general non-Kolmogorovian representations outside
physics (see, e.g., [19, 20]). In this respect, it should be noted that prospect theory already proposes
non-Kolmogorovian probability models of probability of human decision [6].
It is clear from the considerations above that one needs a deeper justification for the use of the Hilbert
space formalism of quantum theory in cognition and decision and, more important, of its necessity. In this
respect, a crucial result comes from increasing evidence that “judgements and decisions create rather than
record” [4] – see. e.g., the following quotations.
“There is a growing body of evidence that supports an alternative conception according to
which preferences are often constructed not merely revealed in the elicitation process. These
constructions are contingent on the framing of the problem, the method of elicitation, and the
context of the choice.” [30]
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“. . . the process of choice – and in particular the act of choice – can make substantial difference
to what is chosen. . . . , there is a particular necessity to take note of (i) chooser dependence,
and (ii) menu dependence, of preference, even judged from a particular person’s perspective.”
[31]
“. . . valuations are initially malleable but become imprinted after the agent is called upon to
make an initial decision.” [32]
It is more and more acknowledged that, in any judgement or decision, a contextual interaction occurs
between the situation that is the object of the evaluation and the individual who takes the decision (agent,
decision-maker), which may affect the situation itself. At the end of this interaction, a result is actualized
among a set of results that were only potential before the interaction [26]. Hence, a judgement/decision
process closely resembles a quantum measurement process, where a contextual interaction occurs between
the quantum particle that is measured and the measurement apparatus, which changes the state of the
quantum particle determining what Heisenberg called “transition from potential to actual”.
We believe that these analogies between micro-physics and cognition are a good starting point towards
a foundational justification for the use of Hilbert space quantum formalism in cognition and decision.
In the sixties and seventies of the previous century, several authors wondered whether and how one can
provide an independent justification for the Hilbert space formalism in quantum physics, deriving this for-
malism from physically justified axioms, resting on well defined empirical notions, directly connected with
the operations that are usually performed in a laboratory. One of the well-known approaches to the foun-
dations of quantum physics is the Geneva-Brussels realistic-operational approach, initiated by Jauch [21]
and Piron [22] in Geneva, and successively extended by Aerts in Brussels (see, e.g., [23, 24]). This research
consisted in abstractly describing any physical entity by relevant sets of states, contexts, properties and
statistical connections between these notions (SCoP system). These theoretical notions are directly inter-
pretable on physical operations on macroscopic apparatuses, such as preparation and registration devices,
performed in spatio-temporal domains, such as physical laboratories. Measurements, state transformations,
outcome probabilities and dynamics can then be expressed in terms of these more fundamental notions. If
suitable axioms are imposed on the mathematical structures underlying a SCoP system, then the Hilbert
space structure of quantum theory emerges as a unique mathematical representation, up to isomorphisms
[33]. This justification provides the “fundamental architecture of quantum theory in Hilbert space”.
We have recently proved that any cognitive entity Ω, e.g., a concept, a conceptual combination, a
proposition, or a more complex decision-making situation, can be abstractly described by a SCoP system
(Σ,L ,C , µ, ν) [25], exactly like in physics. We review the essential elements of a SCoP system in cognition
in the following.
(1) The complex of experimental procedures conceived by the experimenter, the experimental setting
and the cognitive effect that one wants to analyse, define a cognitive entity Ω, and are usually associated
with a preparation procedure of a state of Ω.
(2) Σ is the set of all states of Ω. A state p of Ω is the consequence of a preparation procedure of Ω
and has a cognitive, rather than physical, nature. The state of the cognitive entity is a state of affairs.
It indeed expresses a “reality of the cognitive entity”, in the sense that, once prepared in a given state,
such condition is independent of any measurement procedure, and can be confronted with the different
participants in an experiment, leading to outcome data and their statistics.
(3) C is the set of all contexts of Ω. A context e is an element that can provoke a change of state of the
cognitive entity. A special context is the one introduced by a measurement. Indeed, when the cognitive
experiment starts, an interaction occurs between the measured entity Ω under study and a participant in
the experiment, in which the state p of Ω generally changes, being transformed to another state q. This
cognitive interaction is formalized by means of a context e.
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(4) L is the set of all properties of Ω. A property a of Ω is something Ω “has” independently of any
context influencing the entity. An entity Ω is a given state p has a set of properties that are actual in that
state, the others being potential. A context e may change the status actual/potential of a property, but
cannot change the property itself.
(5) The change function µ : Σ×C ×Σ −→ [0, 1] is such that, for every p, q ∈ Σ, e ∈ C , µ(q, e, p) is the
probability, as the large number limit of relative frequencies, that the context e changes the initial state p
of Ω to the final state q.
Once recognizes at once in (1)–(5) the building blocks of the realistic-operational description of a
physical entity, in the sense that in both physical and cognitive realms, a SCoP system incorporates all
what is needed to study what an entity is, behaves and changes under a context. These impressive analogies
indicate that the axioms generally used to justify the Hilbert space formalism of quantum physics are also
appropriate to represent cognitive entities and processes. This provides an independent foundational clue
and non-phenomenological motivation, if not a justification, that the mathematics of Hilbert space should
be used to represent judgement and decision phenomena.
In Sect. 4, we will provide a realistic-operational description of a specific decision-making situation, the
Ellsberg paradox, setting the grounds for a quantum mathematical representation of it in Sect. 5. In the
next section, we will instead summarize the serious difficulties of both traditional and bounded rationality
approaches to handle such kind of decision-making situations.
3 Rational decision theory and its puzzles
Traditional theories of rational decision-making rest on the tenet that, in situations of uncertainty, indi-
vidual agents choose in such a way to maximize their expected utility, or degree of satisfaction.
In 1944, von Neumann and Morgenstern presented in a seminal work the first axiomatic formulation
of expected utility theory. People continuously take decisions among different options. These decisions
are assumed to reveal underlying preferences. Then, von Neumann and Morgenstern proposed a set of
“reasonable” axioms on human preferences such that, if the decisions are coherent, in the sense that they
reveal axiom satisfying preferences, then the decisions are equivalent to the maximization of an expected
utility functional with respect to a Kolmogorovian probability measure [2].
von Neumann and Morgenstern’s formulation of expected utility theory has a major limitation, in
that it only deals with the uncertainty that can be formalized by known probabilities (also referred to
as objective uncertainty, or risk). On the other hand, situations frequently occur in which uncertainty
cannot be formalized by known probabilities (also referred to as subjective uncertainty, or ambiguity)
[34]. The Bayesian approach to probability minimizes the distinction between objective and subjective
uncertainty introducing the notion of subjective probability. Even when probabilities are not known, people
may still construct their own beliefs, or priors (which may differ from one individual to another), and
they maximize expected utility with respect to these priors. Indeed, Leonard Savage presented in 1954 an
axiomatic formulation of expected utility theory which extends the one of von Neumann and Morgenstern
to subjective uncertainty [3].
We summarize in the following the essential definitions and results of Savage’s expected utility theory,
together with its major pitfalls. We refer to [35, 36] for detailed reviews of these results.
Savage introduced a set of basic notions, including states of nature, consequences, preferences, and
looked for justified axioms on preferences able to provide a representation theorem in which ordering of
preferences is characterized by maximization of expected utility. This procedure formally resembles the
procedures used in the axiomatizations of quantum physics in Sect. 4.
Let S be the set of all (physical) states of nature, which we assume to be discrete and finite here, for
the sake of simplicity. Let P(S ) be the power set of S and A ⊆ P(S ) be a (Boolean) σ-algebra. An
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element E ∈ A denotes an event. A Kolmogorovian probability measure over A is a function p : A ⊆
P(S ) −→ [0, 1] satisfying the axioms of Kolmogorov [1].
Then, let X be the set of all consequences, whose elements we assume to denote monetary payoffs,
hence real numbers, here, for the sake of simplicity. In Savage’s formulation, a function f : S −→ X
denotes an act. Let F be the set of all acts. Let us endow F with a weak preference relation %, that is, a
reflexive, symmetric and transitive relation over the Cartesian product F ×F . In %, the relations  and
∼ denote strong preference and indifference, respectively, that is, we write f  g whenever an individual
strictly prefers act f to act g and f ∼ g whenever the individual is indifferent between f and g.
Next, let u : X −→ < be a utility function over X . This function typically expresses the decision-
maker’s taste, hence it is assumed to be strictly increasing and continuous, with additional technical
constraints related to the specification of the decision-maker’s attitude towards risk.
The mathematical definitions above can be simplified by introducing a set {E1, . . . , En} of mutually
exclusive and exhaustive elementary events, where Ei = {si ∈ S }, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, which thus form a
partition of S . For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let xi be the utility associated by the act f to the event Ei. Then,
f can be equivalently expressed by the 2n-tuple f = (E1, x1; . . . ;En, xn), meaning that the individual will
get the outcome x1 if the event E1 occurs (i.e. the state of nature s1 realizes), . . . , the outcome xn if the
event En occurs (i.e. the state of nature sn realizes).
Finally, we denote by W (f) =
∑n
i=1 p(Ei)u(xi) the expected utility associated with the act f with
respect to the Kolmogorovian probability measure p.
In his representation theorem, Savage proved that, if the algebraic structure (F ,%) satisfies a number
of “reasonable” axioms1 then, for every f, g ∈ F , a unique Kolmogorovian probability measure p and a
unique (up to positive affine transformations) utility function u exist such that f is preferred to g, i.e.
f % g, if and only if the expected utility of f is greater than the expected utility of g, i.e. W (f) ≥ W (g).
For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the utility value u(xi) depends on the decision-maker’s risk preferences, while
p(Ei) is interpreted as the subjective probability, expressing the individual’s belief that the event Ei occurs
[3].
Savage’s result is both compelling at a normative level and testable at a descriptive level. Indeed:
(i) if the axioms are intuitively reasonable and decision-makers agree with them, then they must all
behave as if they were maximizing an expected utility with respect to a single subjective probability
distribution satisfying Kolmogorov’s axioms;
(ii) the axioms suggest to design decision-making experiments to test the validity of expected utility
theory, hence of the axioms themselves, in real life situations.
Because of (i), Savage’s expected utility formulation is generally accepted to prescribe “how rational
agents should choose”. However, one the one side, the theory offers very little about where beliefs come
from and how they should be calculated and, on the other side, regarding (ii), decision-making experiments
have systematically found deviations from that rational behaviour in concrete situations.
In particular, Daniel Ellsberg proved in 1961 in a number of thought experiments that decision-makers
generally prefer acts with known (or objective) probabilities over acts with unknown (or subjective) prob-
abilities [7]. We analyse here the famous Ellsberg three-color example as a paradigmatic example to show
that (i) traditional decision theories do not work, (ii) bounded rationality approaches are not sufficiently
explanatory, (iii) quantum structures are needed.
Consider one urn with 30 red balls and 60 balls that are either yellow or black, the latter in unknown
proportion. One ball will be drawn at random from the urn. Then, free of charge, a person is asked to bet
1One of the axioms is the famous sure thing principle, which is violated in the Ellsberg paradox. The other axioms
are: ordinal event independence, comparative probability, non-degeneracy, small event continuity and dominance, and have a
technical nature [3]. However, these axioms are not relevant to the present purposes, hence we will not dwell on them, for the
sake of brevity.
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1/3 2/3
Act Red Yellow Black
f1 $100 $0 $0
f2 $0 $0 $100
f3 $100 $100 $0
f4 $0 $100 $100
Table 1. The payoff matrix for the Ellsberg three-color example.
on pairs of the acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 in Table 1. Ellsberg suggested that, when asked to rank these acts, most
individuals will prefer f1 over f2 and f4 over f3. Indeed, f1 and f4 are unambiguous acts, in the sense that
they are associated with events over known probabilities – the events “a red ball is drawn” and “a yellow or
black ball is drawn” are associated with objective probabilities 1/3 and 2/3, respectively. On the contrary,
f2 and f3 are ambiguous acts, in the sense that they are associated with events over unknown probabilities
– the events “a yellow ball is drawn” and “a black ball is drawn” are both associated with a probability
ranging from 0 to 2/3. This attitude of decision-makers to prefer “probabilized over non-probabilized
uncertainty” has been known as ambiguity aversion since Ellsberg studies [7].
Several experiments on Ellsberg urns decisions, but also on financial, insurance and medical decisions,
have confirmed the Ellsberg preferences f1  f2 and f4  f3, thus indicating that ambiguity aversion is
a good candidate to explain concrete decisions in this case, and only Slovic and Tversky found ambiguity
seeking patterns (see, e.g., [36] for a review of experimental studies).
In [27], we tested various human decision puzzles, including the Ellsberg three-color example. We
asked 200 people, chosen among colleagues and friends, to fill a questionnaire in which they had to choose
between various options. People had on average a basic knowledge of probability theory, but no specific
training in decision theory. Participants were provided with a questionnaire similar to the one in Figure 1,
in which they had to choose between acts f1 and f2 and, then, between acts f3 and f4 in Table 1. Overall,
125 participants preferred acts f1 and f4, 38 preferred acts f1 and f3, 6 preferred acts f2 and f3, and 31
preferred acts f2 and f4. This means that 163 participants over 200 preferred act f1 over act f2, which
entails a preference weight of 0.815. Also, 156 participants over 200 preferred act f4 over act f3, which
entails a preference weight of 0.780. The inversion rate is 0.655, a pattern that agrees with the Ellsberg
preferences found in the literature and significantly indicates the presence of ambiguity aversion.
Preferences of decision-makers who are sensitive to ambiguity, that is, are ambiguity averse or ambiguity
seeking, cannot be explained within Savage’s expected utility theory, because they violate the sure thing
principle, according to which, preferences should be independent of the common outcome. In the specific
case of the three-color example, preferences should not depend on whether the common event “a yellow
ball is drawn” pays off $0 or $100. More technically, Savage’s expected utility theory predicts consistency
of preferences, namely, f1 is preferred to f2 if and only if f3 is preferred to f4. A simple calculation
shows that this is impossible within a traditional expected utility framework. Indeed, if we denote by
p˜R, p˜Y and p˜B the probability that a red ball, a yellow ball, a black ball, respectively, is drawn (with
p˜R = 1/3 = 1− (p˜Y + p˜B)), then the expected utilities W (fi), i = 1, 2, 3, 4, are such that W (f1) > W (f2)
if and only if (p˜R− p˜B)(u(100)− u(0)) > 0 if and only if W (f3) > W (f4). We can equivalently say that no
assignment of Kolmogorovian probabilities p˜R, p˜Y and p˜B reproduces a preference with W (f1) > W (f2)
and W (f4) > W (f3), whence the Ellsberg paradox.
Several extensions of Savage’s expected utility theory have been put forward in order to accommodate
the Ellsberg paradox (see, e.g., the reviews in [35] and [36]). One of the major proposals is Tversky and
Kahneman’s cumulative prospect theory, mentioned in Sect. 2 and elaborated within a bounded rationality
research programme [6]. In particular, to reproduce Ellsberg preferences, Tversky and Kahneman replaced
7
Figure 1. A sample of the questionnaire related to the decision-making experiment on the Ellsberg
three-color example: choice between acts f1 and f2 in Table 1.
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(i) the utility function u by a scaling function u′ reflecting the subjective value of the outcome utility,
and (ii) the subjective probability measure p by a non-additive measure p′ satisfying the mathematical
properties of a capacity. As we have mentioned in Sect. 2, such bounded rationality models, though
descriptively interesting and easily interpretable intuitively, provide a too fragmented view of decision
theory, hence they are not able to provide a unitary and adequate explanatory framework to understand
the deep aspects of decision processes. In addition, cumulative prospect theory, as well as other major
non-expected utility models, fails to reproduce the empirical results of a recently elaborated variant of the
Ellsberg paradox, the Machina paradox [27, 37, 38].
An innovative aspect of descriptive, like bounded rationality, approaches, is the representation of subjec-
tive probabilities by more general, possibly non-Kolmogorovian, mathematical structures. This is crucial
towards a more satisfactory framework for human decision-making that goes beyond Savage’s expected
utility, as we will see in Sect. 5.
In the next section, we intend to elaborate a realistic-operational description of a decision-making
situation, using the Ellsberg three-color example as a case study. We will demonstrate that, once the
Ellsberg paradox situation is formulated in terms of states, contexts, properties and transition probabilities,
then the application of the mathematical formalism of quantum theory directly follows from the canonical
representation of these realistic-operational terms in Hilbert space.
4 A realistic-operational description of a decision-making situation
In this section, we specify the realistic-operational description of cognitive entities in Sect. 2 to the decision-
making situation presented in the Ellsberg three-color example [25]. In it, we explicitly distinguish physical
from cognitive, in this case, decision-making, entities. Analogously, we distinguish physical from cognitive
states of nature, though one can intuitively see that some cognitive states are mapped into the corresponding
physical states.
In the Ellsberg three-color example, the cognitive, i.e. decision-making, entity ΩDM is the urn with
30 red balls and 60 yellow or black balls in unknown proportion. This is what the individual reads in a
questionnaire, interacts with and takes a decision on.
The cognitive entity ΩDM is associated with a defined set ΣDM of states.
2 A state p ∈ ΣDM has a
cognitive nature and incorporates aspects of ambiguity. A context e does not pertain to ΩDM but can
interact with it. Let CDM be the set of all contexts of ΩDM . The interaction of ΩDM with a context
e ∈ CDM may determine a change of the state of ΩDM from p to a different state q. The probability of such
a state transition will be denoted by µ(q, e, p), where µ : ΣDM×CDM×ΣDM −→ [0, 1]. We might complete
the realistic-operational description of ΩDM defining a set LDM of properties and an actuality relation
connecting properties and states. However, they are not needed in the Ellsberg three-color scenario, hence
we omit specifying these notions here, for the sake of brevity, though they may be relevant in more general
decision situations.
Let us now introduce a color context eC ∈ CDM , which is the context associated with a drawing of a
ball from the urn. As a result of the drawing, we have three possible outcomes, R, Y and B, corresponding
to the colors of the balls, red, yellow and black, respectively. The outcomes R, Y and B are the eigenvalues
of eC and are respectively associated with the final states, or eigenstates, pR, pY and pB of the cognitive
entity ΩDM . These eigenstates are such that µ(pi, eC , pi) = 1, i ∈ {R, Y,B}.
2Some authors identify the notion of “state” with the notion of “belief state” of the individual participating in the cognitive
experiment, e.g., taking the decision (see, e.g., [4, 9, 15]). We instead neatly distinguish states from measurements here. A
state is defined by a preparation procedure of the cognitive entity under investigation. The participant in the experiment acts
as a (measurement) context that interacts with the cognitive entity and changes its state.
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The color context eC introduces three mutually exclusive and exhaustive elementary events Ei =
(eC , {i}), i ∈ {R, Y,B}, which are such that the subjective probability that the event Ei occurs when the
cognitive entity ΩDM is in the state p is given by the transition probability µ(pi, eC , p) ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ {R, Y,B}.
Then, in analogy with Savage’s expected utility theory, we can introduce monetary payoffs x ∈X ⊆ <,
utility functions u : X −→ < and acts taking the form f = (ER, xR;EY , xY , EB, xB), mapping the event
Ei into the payoff xi, i ∈ {R, Y,B}. In particular, the acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 in Table 1, Sect. 3 are defined
in the way above.
Let us now come to the operational-realistic description of a decision-making process in the Ellsberg
three-color situation. Suppose that, in the absence of any context, the entity ΩDM is in the initial state
p0. This state corresponds to a preparation of the cognitive entity ΩDM and can be set by the information
on the corresponding physical entity. For example, it is reasonable to assume that p0 is such that, for
every i ∈ {R, Y,B}, µ(pi, eC , p0) = 1/3, because of the indifference principle. Whenever an individual
is asked to rank f1 and f2, the individual’s attitude towards ambiguity, e.g., ambiguity aversion, can be
described as a new context e1 ∈ CDM acting on ΩDM in the initial state p0 and changing p0 into a new state
p1, characterized by a new probability distribution µ(pi, eC , p1), i ∈ {R, Y,B}. Similarly, whenever the
individual is asked to rank f3 and f4, the individual’s attitude towards ambiguity, e.g., ambiguity aversion,
can be described as a new context e2 ∈ CDM acting on ΩDM in the initial state p0 and changing p0 into
a new state p2, characterized by a new probability distribution µ(pi, eC , p2), i ∈ {R, Y,B}. The cognitive
states p1 and p2, and their ensuing probability distributions, are responsible of the inversion of preferences
which occur in the Ellsberg paradox situation.
Finally, a decision process between acts f1 and f2 can be operationally described as a measurement
context e12 ∈ CDM acting on the entity ΩDM in the ambiguity averse state p1, with possible outcomes
“yes” and “no”. Similarly, a decision process between acts f3 and f4 can be described as a measurement
context e34 ∈ CDM acting on the entity ΩDM in the ambiguity averse state p2, with possible outcomes
“yes” and “no”. These contexts give rise of the statistics of outcomes in a decision-making test on the
Ellsberg three-color urn.
Now, the considerations in Sect. 2 naturally indicate to represent states, contexts, properties and
outcome probabilities of ΩDM by using the canonical quantum representation of states, contexts, properties
and outcome probabilities in Hilbert space. In particular, subjective probabilities will be represented using
the Born rule of quantum probability. This is what we intend to show in the next section where the realistic-
operational terms defined here will be canonically represented using quantum mathematical terms.
5 A novel quantum representation of the Ellsberg paradox
In this section we elaborate a new quantum representation of the three-color example straightly follow-
ing the canonical Hilbert space representation of the realistic and operational notions in Sect. 3. This
representation generalizes and strengthens those in [16, 17, 26, 27].
5.1 Quantum representation of basic notions
The cognitive entity ΩDM is associated with a Hilbert space H . Since, the three-color example involves
three mutually exclusive and exhaustive elementary events, H can be chosen to be isomorphic to the
complex Hilbert space C3 of ordered triples of complex numbers. Let {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)} be the
canonical orthonormal basis of C3.
A state pv of the entity ΩDM is represented by the unit vector |v〉 ∈H , |||v〉|| =
√〈v|v〉 = 1.
The elementary event Ei is represented by the one-dimensional orthogonal projection operator Pi =
|i〉〈i|, i ∈ {R, Y,B}, where we choose |R〉 = (1, 0, 0), |Y 〉 = (0, 1, 0) and |B〉 = (0, 0, 1). The color context
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eC is then represented by the spectral family {PR, PY , PB}.
In the canonical basis of C3, the unit vector |v〉 can be written as
|v〉 = ρReiθR |R〉+ ρY eiθY |Y 〉+ ρBeiθB |B〉 = (ρReiθR , ρY eiθY , ρBeiθB ) (1)
We use the Born rule to represent subjective probabilities. Then, the subjective probability that the
elementary event Ei, i ∈ {R, Y,B}, occurs when the entity ΩDM is in the state pv is given by
µv(Ei) = 〈v|Pi|v〉 = |〈i|v〉|2 = ρ2i (2)
In addition, the subjective probability that the event E, represented by the orthogonal projection operator
PE , occurs when the cognitive entity ΩDM is in the state pv is µv(E) = 〈v|PE |v〉 = ||PE |v〉||2. Finally, for
every state pv represented by the unit vector |v〉, the subjective probability measure
µv : L (C3) −→ [0, 1] (3)
is a quantum probability measure over the lattice L (C3) of all orthogonal projection operators on the
Hilbert space C3.
Compatibility with the standard three-color situation entails ρ2R =
1
3 , hence it follows from Eq. (1) that
|v〉 = ( 1√
3
eiθR , ρY e
iθY , ρBe
iθB ) = (
1√
3
eiθR , ρY e
iθY ,
√
2
3
− ρ2yeiθB ) (4)
where the last equality is obtained from
√〈v|v〉 = 1.
Special states are the state with no black balls represented by
|vRY 〉 = ( 1√
3
eiθR ,
√
2
3
eiθY , 0) (5)
and the state with no yellow balls represented by
|vRB〉 = ( 1√
3
eiθR , 0,
√
2
3
eiθB ) (6)
The acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 are represented by the self-adjoint operators
Fˆ1 = u(100)PR + u(0)PY + u(0)PB (7)
Fˆ2 = u(0)PR + u(0)PY + u(100)PB (8)
Fˆ3 = u(100)PR + u(100)PY + u(0)PB (9)
Fˆ4 = u(0)PR + u(100)PY + u(100)PB (10)
respectively. The utility function u(·) is not given by the theory but it is revealed in a decision test by
concrete choices, in analogy with standard procedures in the literature.
The expected utility Wv(fi), i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, in a generic state pv of the entity ΩDM is
Wv(f1) = 〈v|Fˆ1|v〉 = 1
3
u(100) +
2
3
u(0) (11)
Wv(f2) = 〈v|Fˆ2|v〉 = (1
3
+ ρ2Y )u(0) + (
2
3
− ρ2Y )u(100) (12)
Wv(f3) = 〈v|Fˆ3|v〉 = (1
3
+ ρ2Y )u(100) + (
2
3
− ρ2Y )u(0) (13)
Wv(f4) = 〈v|Fˆ4|v〉 = 1
3
u(0) +
2
3
u(100) (14)
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As we can see, the expected utilities Wv(f1) and Wv(f4) do not depend on the cognitive state pv of the
entity ΩDM , in agreement with the fact that f1 and f4 are unambiguous acts. On the contrary, the expected
utilities Wv(f2) and Wv(f3) do depend on the cognitive state pv, in agreement with the fact that f2 and
f3 are ambiguous acts. This also agrees with our assumption that cognitive states provide information on
ambiguity.
5.2 Reproducing Ellsberg preferences with ambiguity averse states
Let us now suppose that, in the absence of any context, the cognitive entity ΩDM is in the initial state p0.
The principle of indifference (see Sect. 4) then suggests that p0 is the state represented by the unit vector
|v0〉 = 1√
3
(1, 1, 1) (15)
leading to uniform probabilities of drawing a red, yellow and black ball. The ambiguity attitude contexts
e1 and e2 will determine a change of state of the entity ΩDM , depending on individual preferences to-
wards ambiguity. For example, two ambiguity seeking states pw1 and pw2 will be such that the following
inequalities hold
Ww1(f2) >
1
3
u(100) +
2
3
u(0) (16)
Ww2(f3) >
1
3
u(0) +
2
3
u(100) (17)
We will instead explicitly determine two ambiguity averse states pw1 and pw2 which reproduce Ellsberg
preferences, that is,
Ww1(f1) > Ww1(f2) (18)
Ww2(f4) > Ww2(f3) (19)
Two general cognitive states pw1 and pw2 states are represented by the unit vectors
|w1〉 = ( 1√
3
eiθR , ρY e
iθY ,
√
2
3
− ρ2yeiθB ) (20)
|w2〉 = ( 1√
3
eiφR , τY e
iφY ,
√
2
3
− τ2y eiφB ) (21)
respectively. For the sake of simplicity, let us look for states with simple phases, namely, θR = φR = 0 and
θY , θB, φY , φB = 0, pi. In particular, one can show that, for every α >
1√
3
, the unit vectors
|w1〉 = ( 1√
3
, α,−
√
2
3
− α2) (22)
|w2〉 = ( 1√
3
,−
√
2
3
− α2, α) (23)
reproduce Ellsberg preferences. However, the ambiguity averse states pw1 and pw2 are not generally or-
thogonal, unless α = ±0.7887. Let us choose the positive sign, so that the orthonormal vectors
|w1〉 = (0.5774, 0.7887,−0.2113) (24)
|w2〉 = (0.5774,−0.2113, 0.7887) (25)
reproduce Ellsberg preferences in the three-color example within a quantum mathematical representation.
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5.3 Modelling empirical data in Hilbert space
The final step of the quantum representation of the three-color example consists in modelling the experimen-
tal data in Sect. 3. To this aim, we describe the decision between acts f1 and f2 by a measurement context
e12 and represent the latter by the spectral family {M,1−M}, where the orthogonal projection operator
M projects onto the one-dimensional subspace generated by the unit vector |m〉 = ( 1√
3
, ρY e
iθY , ρBe
iθB ),
where ρ2Y + ρ
2
B =
2
3 . The one-dimensional projection operator M is then given by
M = |m〉〈m| =

1
3
1√
3
ρY e
−iθY 1√
3
ρBe
−iθB
1√
3
ρY e
iθY ρ2Y ρY ρBe
i(θY −θB)
1√
3
ρBe
iθB ρY ρBe
−i(θY −θB) ρ2B
 (26)
Analogously, we describe the decision between acts f3 and f4 by a measurement context e34 and represent
the latter by the spectral family {N,1 − N}, where the orthogonal projection operator N projects onto
the one-dimensional subspace generated by the unit vector |n〉 = ( 1√
3
, τY e
iφY , τBe
iφB ), where τ2Y + τ
2
B =
2
3 .
The one-dimensional projection operator N is then given by
N = |n〉〈n| =

1
3
1√
3
τY e
−iφY 1√
3
τBe
−iφB
1√
3
τY e
iφY τ2Y τY τBe
i(φY −φB)
1√
3
τBe
iφB τY τBe
−i(φY −φB) τ2B
 (27)
We refer to the unit vectors |v0〉 = 1√3(1, 1, 1) and |w1〉 and |w2〉 in Eqs. (24) and (25). It follows that the
conditions
〈m|m〉 = 1 (28)
〈n|n〉 = 1 (29)
〈w1|M |w1〉 = 0.815 (30)
〈w2|N |w2〉 = 0.780 (31)
〈v0|M |v0〉 = 0.500 (32)
〈v0|N |v0〉 = 0.500 (33)
must be satisfied by the real parameters ρY , ρB, θY , θB, τY , τB, φY and φB. Equations (28) and (29)
are determined by normalization conditions, while Eqs. (30) and (31) are determined by empirical data.
Finally, Eqs. (32) and (33) are determined by the fact that decision-makers who are not sensitive to
ambiguity should overall be indifferent between f1 and f2, as well as between f3 and f4. Hence, on average,
half respondents are expected to prefer f1 (f3) and the other half f2 (f4). To simplify the analysis, let us
set θY = φB = 0. Hence, we are left with a system of 6 equations in 6 unknown variables whose solution is
ρY = 0.6853
ρB = 0.4438
θB = 105.07
◦
τY = 0.4785
τB = 0.6616
φY = 102.87
◦
(34)
Equivalently, we get
|m〉 = (0.5773, 0.6853, 0.4438ei105.07◦) (35)
|n〉 = (0.5773, 0.4785ei102.87◦ , 0.6616) (36)
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Thus, the orthogonal projection operators in Eqs. (26) and (27) reproducing the experimental data in
Sect. 3 are
M =
 0.333 0.396 0.256e−i105.07◦0.396 0.470 0.304e−i105.07◦
0.256ei105.07
◦
0.304ei105.07
◦
0.197
 (37)
N =
 0.333 0.276e−i102.87◦ 0.3820.276ei102.87◦ 0.229 0.317ei102.87◦
0.382 0.317e−i102.87◦ 0.438
 (38)
The construction of a quantum model for the data on the Ellsberg three-color experiment in Sect. 3 is
thus completed. As we can see, the quantum model naturally arises from the canonical Hilbert space
representation of the realistic-operational termsin Sect. 4.
6 Conclusions
Despite its phenomenological success to deal with classically problematical cognitive puzzles, the quan-
tum cognition research programme still poses challenging questions regarding its explanatory power and
necessity.
In this paper, we specialized to the Ellsberg paradox decision situation a realistic-operational foundation
which we have recently extended from physics to cognition. Then, we applied to the Ellsberg three-color
example the canonical quantum representation of realistic-operational terms in Hilbert space.
This result on the Ellsberg paradox situation is paradigmatic, in the sense that one can follow the same
strategy to generally claim that the mathematical representation of human judgements and decision-making
in Hilbert space has now an independent motivation of a foundational, rather than phenomenological,
nature.
To conclude, we agree that quantum theory in Hilbert space is not the ultimate theory in cognition –
recent results on sequential measurements and order effects seem to confirm this conclusion(see, e.g., [25]).
However, we also believe that there are strong theoretical motivations, in addition to its empirical success
and unitary explanation, to continue using Hilbert space structures in cognition.
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